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Abstract—Due to the extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) in civil and military environment, effective deployment
and scheduling of a swarm of UAVs are rising to be a challenging
issue in edge computing. This is especially apparent in the area
of Internet of Things (IoT) where massive UAVs are connected
for communications. One of the characteristics of IoT is that
an operator can interact with more than one UAVs for the
effective scheduling under multi-task requests. Based on this
scenario, we clarify the issue on how to maintain the energy
efficiency of UAVs and guarantee the reputation gain during
the scheduling deployment. In this paper, we first formulate the
energy consumption and reputation into the decision model of
UAVs scheduling. A game-theoretic scheme is then developed
for the optimal decision searching. With the developed model, a
range of important parameters of UAV scheduling are thoroughly
investigated. Our numerical results show that the proposed
scheduling strategy is able to increase the reputation and decrease
the energy consumption of UAVs simultaneously. In addition, in
the game process, the profit of an operator can be maximized
and the network economy research can be explored.
Index Terms—Energy efficiency, reputation, UAV scheduling,
game theory, performance analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), originally used in mil-
itary tasks, including reconnaissance and monitoring from
the sky, have been extended to civilian domains such as
remote sensing of mapping, bridge inspection, and precision
agriculture monitoring [1] [2]. With the support of 5G, UAV-
related technologies play a critical role in the field of Internet
of Things (IoT) for its important mobile edge services, such
as aerial video surveillance, providing unprecedented aerial
perspective for ground monitoring [3]. Specifically, UAVs can
work at the places where people may not be able to reach and
can be scheduled effectively to execute multiple tasks.
The flight time of UAVs has not kept pace with technol-
ogy advancement due to the limitations of traditional battery
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technologies. Radical improvement in energy efficiency is
always the essential requirement of UAVs scheduling. Existing
studies on the restriction problem of battery capacity have
been developed and performed. For example, Ghazzai et al. [4]
proposed a generic scheduling framework to manage a fleet of
micro UAVs, in which technical specifications of UAVs and
the limitation of battery capacities are considered. With the
aim of operators in commerce, the profits of operators can be
improved by minimizing the energy cost.
In addition to the effect of energy consumption, the reputa-
tion of UAVs can be further affected for UAVs’ performance
in a mission by measuring their credibility. For example, low
energy supply can decrease the reputation of a working UAV
and reduce the probability of being scheduled. A series of
reputation schemes have been designed for UAVs scheduling.
Trestian et al. [5] proposed a framework which considers
the reputation into a network selection problem to model a
reputation-based system.
Most of existing research on UAV scheduling have energy
consumption and reputation gain modeled separately [6] [7]
[8] [9] [10] [11] [12]. Even though a few models integrate
energy efficiency and reputation improvement into the mod-
eling of UAV scheduling [13] [14], there has been no study
constructing UAV scheduling models from the perspective of
commercial profits. Different from existing research, this paper
addresses the scheduling issue of UAVs from the integration of
energy consumption and reputation gains of UAVs that affect
the practical economic benefits.
In this study, we propose a scheduling strategy by consid-
ering characteristics of UAVs in terms of energy consumption
and reputation in threefold. Firstly, we propose an energy
efficient strategy and a reputation-based mechanism separately
to construct the scheduling strategy rules of UAVs. Secondly,
we build a game-theoretic model to study the scheduling prob-
lem of working UAVs when they receive new task requests.
Thirdly, we derive the balance of energy minimization and
reputation maximization of UAVs to achieve the Nash equilib-
rium efficiently for UAVs scheduling. The main contributions
of this study can be summarized as follows:
• The energy consumption model and the reputation gain
model are formulated separately with respect to game
theoretic features. The energy consumption model is
constructed according to the working state and future
scheduling strategy of an UAV. The compensation mecha-
nism of the reputation model is developed by considering
the practical scenario in commercial competitions.
• The energy model and the reputation model are built
into a game theoretic model to maximize the payoff of
a network operator. The reached Nash equilibrium point
by the developed game mechanism can help make the
scheduling decisions of UAVs in multi-tasks requests
from network operators.
• By virtue of the developed game model, we thoroughly
investigate the effects of critical system parameters on
the energy consumption, reputation gain and the payoff.
The relationships among reputation, energy consumption
and payoff are explored based on these parameters. In
addition, fluctuations of the objectives in our proposed
mechanism are further analyzed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the related studies including state-of-the-art on
energy efficiency and reputation of UAV scheduling. Section
III provides preliminary work and important concepts that can
facilitate the understanding of our proposed work. Section
IV presents the system architecture, the energy consumption
model, and the reputation gain model. Section V describes
the game mechanism. The numerical results are provided in
Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Sufficient energy supply is critical for the implementation of
mobile edge tasks, but it generates cost to network operators.
From the perspective of the lucrative purpose, sustainable
task assignment to UAVs can promote the profit gain of
network operators. However, it is a challenging problem of
constructing the energy consumption and reputation models
with the purpose of commercial profit maximization for UAV
operators. Therefore, effective UAV scheduling strategies with
the consideration of energy and reputation are urgent to be
proposed. In what follows, we introduce the related work on
this problem.
A. Energy Consumption
Features-oriented modelling can achieve UAV scheduling
and maximize the profit of network operators effectively. In
disaster areas, UAVs in the optimum deployment state can
benefit search and rescue operations, which was studied in [7].
Li et al. [8] proposed the Dijkstra algorithm which is used to
analyse the shortest path from the UAV site to the gathering
site. The arrival time of a UAV can be computed according to
the shortest path and permissible speed. Therefore, the UAVs
that can satisfy the time constraint of rescue will be obtained,
which can significantly improve the working efficiency when
UAVs are called from other sites. The research reported in [9]
described the scheduling framework of solving the problem of
sequential search tasks. The authors used previous empirical
data to formulate the problem of task allocation to network
operators. The allocation strategy is worked as an optional
non-preemptive scheduling system. In geometrically complex
environments such as dense urban areas and mountainous
terrains, quality-aware UAV coverage and path planing prob-
lems were researched in [10]. An occlusion-aware way-points
generation algorithm was designed to find the best set of way-
points for taking pictures in a target area to satisfy the spatial
resolution requirement. These selected waypoints are assigned
to multiple UAVs by solving a vehicle routing problem, so that
all the way-points are visited within a global deadline to meet
the temporal resolution requirement. An automated and decen-
tralized surveillance system for the problem of detecting and
tracking on UAV scheduling in a bounded area was proposed
in [15]. In this work, a non-trivial robotic implementation of
the distributed algorithm was provided for a set of instances
and challenging problems. For the unique UAV characteristics
of being replaced with grounded and fixed sensors, several
researchers devised tailored algorithms based on the top-down
methodology for the specific application scenarios [15] [16]
[17]. The authors in [18] formulated an automated system
to ease the operator’s workload by breaking up the video
streams into parts and scheduling a subset of them for the
operator’s inspection. In this work, problems are formulated
as a time-indexed integer programming where time is discrete,
and mixed-integer non-linear programming is combined with
cutting framework to obtain the optimal solution.
Dynamic modelling and approaches in tasks allocation are
key solutions to UAVs scheduling. In optimization, dynamic
ant colony algorithm has been widely employed in areas
including UAVs task allocation, power optimization, and mod-
elling. Particularly, UAVs need long-term running and light
weight power source for multi-tasks implementation. There-
fore, tasks allocation mechanisms require high adversarial
models to overcome the intrinsic complexity (such as the
dynamic nature of UAVs) in different systems. Wu et al. [6]
stated how to allocate dynamic tasks in UAV systems by
constructing a dynamic ant colony’s lobar division (DACLD)
model which is based on the classic fixed response threshold.
The DACLD model has the characteristics of a distributed
framework which solve not only the dynamic problems in
execution order, multi-state, adaptive response threshold and
multi-individual response, but also the complex tasks by a
swarm of agents. Martin et al. [19] proposed a mobility
ant colony optimization (ACO)-based model for multilevel
swarms of UAVs by generating unpredictable trajectories with
a chaotic solution of dynamic systems. In the research, chaotic
dynamics are explained as the typical solutions to deterministic
systems with the specific properties, but these solutions are
bounded, globally time invariant and sensitive to initial condi-
tions, and consequently they are unpredictable in a long time.
Integrating these solutions to the mobility model can obtain
deterministic but unpredictable trajectories. Therefore, their
system combines the Ordinary Differential Equations with the
existing Ant Colony Algorithm, and considers the nonlinear
chaotic system [20] to illustrate the transition from the random
part of an ACO algorithm to a chaotic one.
Another emerging mobility model was designed for a fleet
of UAVs based on a fuzzy logic inference system [21].
It develops an alpha-based mobility model which integrates
energy level, coverage area and network connectivity attributes
to make a mobility decision. This novel fuzzy inference system
has been implemented to compute the values of a fellowship
weighting parameter, named Alpha. Then the most suitable
UAV can be selected by the system.
Energy modelling and optimization determine the level of
tasks implementation in an UAV system. Phung and Morin
[22] proposed a modeling of the energy consumption of a class
of small convertible system called vertical Take-off and Land-
ing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VTOL-UAVs). This method is
based on a six-parameter-analytical model which lies on a set
of coplanar propellers for propulsion and wings to improve the
energy efficiency. In 5G based IoT and body sensor networks
(BSN), the discovery of the energy over-consumption is a
challenging problem in the removal, query and routing of
network nodes. However, a high transmission capacity cannot
be guaranteed in some approaches that demand for the energy
conservation and fault tolerance. Therefore, the authors in
[23] presented an architecture which utilizes XML charts to
perform device discovery on the basis of networks state cost
and available energy.
B. Reputation Gain
Reputation mechanisms in economics have drawn extensive
attentions and been extended to engineering and industry for
long-term development. A semi-distributed reputation mech-
anism based on a dynamic data-driven application system
was proposed in [11], where the local reputation and global
reputation are involved. Local reputation is dynamically and
selectively injected to the central controller, where injected
data are collected for global reputation computation. Subse-
quently, the central controller can detect malicious nodes in
unknown networks by the information of dynamic change of
trust and the balance of distributed nodes. Tian et al. [12]
considered dynamic and diversity attacking strategies in the
simulation of evaluating reputation management schemes. The
evaluation method is proved to be able to depict a detailed
evolution process. Tang et al. [24] discussed a new reputation-
based mechanism for the proof of work (PoW) computation
in the blockchain, in which miners are incentive to conduct
honest mining. An algorithm is designed to encourage the
honest mining of miners in this work. The evolution of
cooperation in public goods games on complex networks is
concentrated in [25], where individuals have various reputation
tolerances. Reputation tolerance-based scheme is proved to
prevent defectors’ free-riding behaviour and enhances the
formation of cooperative clusters. Reputation-based voting
scheme was designed in [26] to ensure secure miner selec-
tion. This scheme evaluates candidates’ reputation combining
both past interactions and recommended opinions from other
vehicles.
With the above metrics, this work aims to achieve the
balance of energy consumption and reputation gain in order
to perform the UAVs scheduling effectively.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Dynamic Game of Incomplete Information
Game theory has been broadly applied in collisions of
resource allocation and routing problems in communication
networks. This tool provides an effective way to achieve an
equilibrium point by a game approach so as to realize their
maximum optimization to some extent. There are three critical
elements in a game theory model: player, strategy and payoff.
The players are the participants of a game event. The strategy
is the rule that players need to follow. The payoff, also known
as revenue, is the benefit or reward that a player/system gains
in a game event under the strategy. Based on these factors, we
consider the players’ characteristics in our model as follows:
• Whether players embrace the complete information: com-
plete information game or incomplete information game;
• Whether players are cooperative: cooperative game or
non-cooperative game;
• Whether the game is dynamic or static over a number of
time periods.
Our model is immersed in non-cooperative dynamic games
with incomplete information according to the application sce-
nario. To analyse dynamic games with incomplete information,
we introduce the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
which will be described as below.
In an incomplete information game, players are unsure
about the payoffs or preferences of opponents. This game can
be modeled as a Bayesian Game that consists of not only
players, strategies and payoff, but the probability distribution
P (I1, . . . , IN ) of players over types, where I1, . . . , IN are
players in the game. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium of the “expanded game” in which each pure
strategy is the set of maps of player types Θ to the strategy
space Ω.
Dynamic game of incomplete information implies that the
strategy is sequentially rational, and no player can improve
the payoffs individually at any stage of the game [27] [28].
The optimal method of a Bayesian game is to define a belief
system, denoted by µ, which determines a posterior for each
player over the set of scheduling in an information set. A
belief system is consistent if it is derived from equilibrium
strategies by Bayes Rule. Here, we have player i and the i’s
strategy choice αh, the posterior probability of i belonging to














P (θ−i|θi)µi(s′i, s−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in a dynamic game of incom-
plete information is about strategy profile s and belief system
µ. The strategy profile s is sequentially rational given by µ,
and the belief system µ is consistent given by s. In order to
better demonstrate the knowledge, we give an example to rep-
resent the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Fig. 1, where 1, 2, 3
are players, and the strategy profile {A,B,C,D,M,N} ∈ Ωi.
We suppose that the strategy of player 1 is A with probability
p and the strategy of player 2 is B with the probability q.




Fig. 1: An example of dynamic game of incomplete
information.
Based on the above strategy rule, the equilibrium we pursue
is “Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium” – a function which relies
on a strategy profile Ωi and a belief system µ. It is noticeable
that the strategy profile Ωi is sequentially rational under the
belief µ and the belief system µ is consistent if given the
strategy profile Ωi. Therefore, if player 1 chooses strategy A
or C, player 2 and player 3 will have no idea about which
exact strategy that player 1 has taken. The game goes into the
information set of players 2 and 3, where strategy M is strictly
preferred to N because it is not sequential and rational.
We suppose that p and 1− p are the predicted probabilities
of A and C for players 2 and 3, respectively. Player 2 has
the probability of q to choose B, so that the probability of
choosing D is 1− q, then the expectation payoff of player 3
choosing M can be expressed as p ·3+(1−p) ·q ·0 = 3p. The
probability of choosing N is p ·0+(1−p) · q ·1 = q−pq. For
player 3, M is strictly preferred to N , so Nash Equilibrium
can be concluded as (C,D,N) and (A,D,M).
IV. THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The flexibility of UAVs is illustrated in different working
scenarios such as agriculture monitoring, major competitions,
and so on. The collected data can be either processed locally
or delivered back to the control centre. The process firstly
starts from customers’ requests initiated in the data control
centre, then the task signal is broadcast to UAVs by the
control centre. Fig. 2 presents a system architecture of an
UAVs scheduling network, where all UAVs can receive the
broadcast of emergency requests from the control center. In
this situation, one of the UAVs may decide to transfer for the
execution of a new task when it receives the task request.
Fig. 2: System structure of UAV scheduling network
Let i ∈ I = {1, . . . , N}, where I is the set of players and
N is the total number of players. The strategy of player i is
denoted by si ∈ Ω , where Ω is the strategy space. A strategy
problem lies in a scenario where a player i works in the place
I for customer A until time t during which it receives a new
request of serving customer B in place II . Because the bid
of players are different, we suppose all payers are selfish and
economically rational. These players have the purpose of 1)
decreasing their energy consumption, while 2) guaranteeing
the increase of their reputation, and 3) attempting to maximize
the payoffs of each individual and the group. The parameters
refereed in the proposed models are summarized in Table I.
Based on the above description, the strategy model, energy
model and reputation mechanism are built in the following
sections.
V. STRATEGY MODEL
A strategy reveals the action rule which is conducted by
UAVs in a game. In our scheme, the strategy relies on
predicted energy consumption and player’s reputation. Our
proposed model can be intuitively depicted in Fig. 3. As shown
in this figure, at time t, the payoff of player i consists of two
elements: consumed energy Et and credits inherited from time
t− 1. For the new task request at time t′, whether the player
accepts the new task will be determined according to expected
Pt′ based on demanded energy. The proposed model, named
payoff-credit model, can be mathematically expressed in the
following sections.
More explicitly, all UAVs embrace the same options of
stay or leave in a lifecycle 0 −→ t′ (as depicted in Fig. 4).
This study falls into a dilemma issue, where the decision on
transferring or not will be studied when an UAV player i works
on the task j until time t during which it receives the request
of new task k. Similarly, in the next life-cycle, the player i
has the same strategic circumstances.
TABLE I: Parameter Representations
Parameter Explanation
j The current task in site I
k A new task in II
t The working time of player i working in task j before
flying away
t′ The time point of player i working in task k before
next flying
Pi,j Payoff of player i of task j
Pi,k Payoff of player i of task k
P i, jt Payoff of player i of task j at time t
Pi,jtk Payoff of player i flying for new task k after doing some
time in task j
cti,j Cost of energy of i for task j at time t
ci,k Average cost of i doing task k
Mi,j Taskj that player i need to working with
Mti,j Task based on j that i finished at time t
Mri,j Residual task based on j after t time
pj Average unit price of energy for i staying in the
current task
pk Average unit price of energy for i leaving for a new task
Eoi Original energy of player i
Ei,j The total energy consumption of finishing the task j in
place I
Eri,j Residual energy of the player i after working some
time on j
Ei,k The total energy consumption of finishing the task k
in place II
bri The reputation compensation that the player i obtain
from tasks
cri,j The cost of the reputation compensation of player i
working on task k
ci,j Cost of player i to do task Mi,j
ri The reputation of player i
r′i The reputation after the change of player i
oi,j The increment of i working in task j
o′i,j The fluctuating increment of i working in j
f(ri,j) Reputation compensation
α, β Weight parameters
ξ1 Minimum coefficient energy required for task k
ξ2 Maximum coefficient energy required for task k
µ, ψ Adjust coefficient of reputation
Wi Residual tasks waiting i to do
λ Coefficient vector
ωi Weight of energy and reputation
Fig. 3: An intuitive understanding of the proposed model
Following the strategy model, the detailed energy model and
reputation model are elaborated in the subsections to support
the strategy.
A. Energy Model
Requests of tasks are broadcast to UAVs by a control
centre or other relaying UAVs. These tasks are the drivers
of energy consumption of UAVs. Our energy model can
Fig. 4: The life-cycle of UAV scheduling
increase the overall payoff of a working UAV system by
taking the energy consumption minimization as one of the
important metrics. Under an emergency request, the player
should consider energy consumption and decide whether to
obey the instructions (stay or leave).
In our scenario, we assume that all energy capacities of
players are fixed and equal. In place I , the payoff of the player
i working on task j until time t can be described as
Pi,j,t = Mi,jpj − (Eoi − Eri,j)ci,j,t (1)
where Eoi and E
r
i,j stand for the original energy and residual
energy of a player i working on task j, respectively. ci,j,t is
the cost of a unit energy. Therefore, (Eoi − Eri,j)ci,j,t is the
total cost of the player i working in the current place until
time t. Mi,j is the workload of a task j, and pj represents the
average price per workload unit charging from customers. Let
us define Mi,jpj−(Eoi −Eri,j)ci,j,t as the payoff benefit gained
from working on task j. This process is dynamic because of
the change of payoff along with the growth of UAV’s working
time.
Once player i receives a new task request, the corresponding
strategy in strategy space Ω = {stay, leave} will be taken. We
assume that the game strategy is only determined by energy
in this stage. In the following, we discuss the two strategies.
• Player i stays in the current working place: player i
keeps working on the task j, and the residual workload
is Mri,j . The total energy consumption of finishing the
task in place I is expected as Ei,j . We have the payoff
Pi,j which is based on the energy cost during working
time.
Pi,j = (Mi,j,t +M
r
i,j)pj − Ei,jci,j (2)





Therefore, according to Equation (2), we have
Pi,j = Mi,jpj − Ei,jci,j (3)
• Player i leaves for a new task: player i leaves the
working place I to place II . Let k represent the new
task, Efj,k denote the energy consumption of player i
flying from place I to place II , Ei,k stand for the energy
consumption of the new task k. Thus, (Ei,k + E
f
j,k)ci,k
is the total cost for energy consumption. For player i,
according energy consumption, the payoff becomes
Pi,k = Mi,kpk − (Ei,k + Efj,k)ci,k (4)
where Mi,k is the workload of the new task of player i,
and pk is the charging price of providing service. The
expression of Mi,kpk − (Eni,k + E
f
j,k)ci,k is the payoff
considering the new task execution. Because the energy
consumption is continuous, it is reasonable to integrate
the payoff of a player working until time t in the place
I into the payoff of the “leave” strategy. In this case, all
payoff of “leave” will be greater than “stay”, which is
meaningless in some extent. Therefore, we concentrate
on the payoff of energy cost if player i makes a “leave”
strategy.
Pi,j,t,k = Pi,k + Pi,j,t
= Mi,kpk − (Ei,k + Efj,k)ci,k + Pi,j,t
(5)
This model has linear features, we shall give the utility
function based on the payoffs of player i in different
strategies. The difference between the payoffs of “stay”
and “leave” can be used to make decisions in terms of
energy cost, which can be expressed with
Wi = Pi,j − Pi,j,t,k (6)
We build a comparison in terms of energy consumption
with respect to working states and future strategies.
Wi > 0, i stays in the task j state;
Wi < 0, i leaves for a new task k;

















where the parameter β is the weight of the preference of player
i’s action.
B. Reputation Mechanism
As part of the incentive mechanism, reputation promotes
players to make a decision of stay or leave. The mechanism
is divided into two categories: credit-exchange systems and
reputation-based systems [29]. Generally, the reputation has
two functions: 1) identifying the misbehaviour nodes by mon-
itoring packet forwarding, and 2) helping the routing protocol
avoid those nodes by informing the source node which has the
selfish nodes on the path. In our study, players’ behaviours are
selfish and can be measured in a reputation-based system, by
which the strategy behaviour of players will be suppressed for
a reputation estimation.
Players usually have strategy tendency when they receive a
task request. However, customers 1 intend to choose “suitable”
players for their tasks such as the UAVs with high reputations
and economic advantages. From the historic records, the fact
that an UAV is rejected in the stage of being chosen implies
the unsatisfactory working efficiency of the UAV in previous
services. Our reputation mechanism can solve this problem
1the party that is served by UAVs
when a customer needs to choose services in the future.
Besides, the reputation mechanism facilitates the player’s
decision on whether it accepts the request, as an addition to
the consideration of energy consumption. To be more specific,
we consider a player’s reputation at time t from two sides:
customer’s evaluation and system’s compensation. The player i
will receive an evaluation according to the performance, which
can be defined by V = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The greater the value
is, the more satisfactory the customer will gain. When the
player switches to a new task without finishing the current task,
its credits will be reduced. On the contrary, the player’s credit
at time t′ will be added. This credit value will be considered
into a new life-cycle of the game iteration. The goal of
reputation models is to maximize the credit and integrate credit
evaluation mechanism into the reputation model, meanwhile,
maximize the profit of the operator. If player i has the current
reputation r before joining the next task k, the new reputation
will be
r′i = ri + εi,. (8)
where r′i is the reputation of the player i receiving the
reputation increment εi,j or εi,k. ri is the initial reputation.
We reference the modelling method of [30] and formulate






0 ≤ Eri ≤ Eor
where oi,j is the expected reputation increment of player
i when it continues to complete task j with the remaining
energy after time t. µ is the adjust coefficient of the reputation.
• If Eri is close to zero, oi,j is µri, and the reputation of
player i will be (1 + µ)r. Player i will not leave for a
new task.
• If Eri gets close to E
o
i , the reputation increment is close
to zero.
Therefore,{
Eri → Eoi , i reputation increment is 0;
Eri → 0, i reputation increment is µri.









Case1: Eri < Ei,k + E
f
i , where Ek is the energy required
for the task k. The residual energy Eri is not enough to finish
the future task k in II , the evaluation credit, from the customer










where vi,j is the value that the player i receives from the
customer. ψ is the adjustment coefficient of the evaluation
value.
Case2: Eri > Ei,k + E
f
i , where the player i can finish
the task k within the energy Eri in place II . In this case the





where ´oi,k is the reputation increment, and vi,k ∈ V is the
evaluation value given by the customer.
Therefore, the reputation of player i can be calculated as
r′i = ri + εi
=
{




i > ξ1(Ei,k + E
f
i );
ri + oi,k, others.
(13)
where η and β are the weight parameters, where η + β = 1,
and o′i,k is used to update the reputation.
We consider that the reputation compensation brings about
the incentives to players who accept tasks to obtain more
reputation. The value of compensation is made up of players
reputation and the emergency degree of tasks. This mechanism
promotes the competition of players. In the two cases above,
the reputation compensation model is given by







where bri is the reputation compensation that the player i
obtains. f(ri,j) is the reputation compensation, and C is the
threshold that the player i can trust. v is the value of task k,
and δ is the coefficient related to the value.
In the next section, the game mechanism and the analysis
process are introduced in detail.
VI. THE GAME MECHANISM
Based on the modelling of energy consumption and repu-
tation gain, the players strategy is constructed for the game
mechanism. We first make a hypothesis and then discuss in
two cases. We suppose






where ci,k is the average cost of the energy consumption that
player i leaves for working on a new task k. Ei,k is the energy
consumption that player i spends on task k, and Efi is the
consumed energy that player i transfers from previous task
j to task k (j is the task that player i initially works on,
and k is the potential task that player i transfers to work for.
They are stated in the strategy model and have been described
in the Fig.4). Let Ei,k + E
f
i = Ēk be the total energy cost
that player i spends for its transferring. c̄i is the average unit
cost of various forms of energies. The cost of the reputation
compensation of player i working on task k will be
cri,k = ci,k − bri,k





where bri,k is the reputation compensation of player i working
on task k. Let ξ1Ek and ξ2Ek be the minimum and maximum






Then, according to Equations (16) and (17), the expectation
of reputation compensation is






The probability of player i completing task k within its energy
allowance will be
P (Ēk ≤ Eri )
=

0, Eri < ξ1Ek;
Eri−ξ1Ek
ξ2Ek−ξ1Ek , ξ1Ek ≤ E
r
i ≤ ξ2Ek;
1, Eri > ξ2Ek.
(19)
1) for case 1: when Ēk < ξ2Ek, the residual energy cannot
support player i to complete the task k. The probability
of player i performing the task k is








Thus, the probability of not finishing the task k is





If player i can finish the task k, the expectation reputa-
















ri + βE( ´oi,k)
)
(22)
Otherwise, the player i cannot finish the task k and the
















Therefore, the reputation increment in this case is
















ri + βE( ´oi,k)
) (24)
2) for case 2: when Ēk ≥ ξ2Ek, the residual energy can












1− ξ1 + ξ2
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Then, the reputation increment in this case is
E2( ´εi,k) = ηE(oi,k) + βE( ´oi,k)
= ηµ
(











Therefore, the player i can receive the expected reputa-
tion in total with




E1( ´εi,k), Ek < ξ2Ek;
E2( ´εi,k), Ek ≥ ξ2Ek.
(28)
For the next round of life-cycle of the game, the compen-
sation based on tasks emergency degree and the benefit
of the compensation fi,k is
















We have the overall cost of reputation including the
reputation increment as follows


















where c∗i,k is the cost of player i implementing task
k, and di is the discounting coefficient of reputation
compensation. When the expected payoff exceeds a
payoff value, the player i considers to do task k.
{c∗i,k,+∞} (32)
Since the payoff is related to the cost according to
Equation (5), the expected payoff of player i doing task
k will be
Ψi,k = Pi,j,t,k − c∗i,k
= Pi,k + Pi,j,t − c∗i,k
= Mi,kpk − (Ei,k + Efj,k)ci,k + Pi,j,t − c
∗
i,k
= Mi,kpk − (
ξ1Ek + ξ2Ek
2
)ci,k + Pi,j,t − c∗i,k
(33)
Let Ψ be the payoff. The cost needs to be minimized,






The purpose of this part is to search the Pareto op-
timal for this optimization problem. There are several
approaches which convert approximation problems into
number of scalar optimization problems. These meth-
ods include weighted sum approach [31], Tchbycheff
approach and boundary intersection approach [32] [33]
[34] [35]. Let ω = (ω1, ω2)T be a weight vector, and
ωi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2 and ω1 + ω2 = 1. Then, the
optimal solution to the following scalar problem can be
concluded




subject to si ∈ Ω
(35)
It exists a Pareto optimal point in the above objective
function, where ω is characterised to be a coefficient
vector and i is the variable to be optimized. The extrema
Φ′(i|ω) proves the equilibrium point. Our proposed
mechanism is characterised in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Game of Energy Consumption and Reputation
Input:
Task Mj ;
The original energy capacity of player i, Eoi,j ;
The average unit price of energy used to task Mj , pj ;
The residual energy after working in j,Eri,j ;
The energy cost for player transfer,Efj,k;
The unit cost of player i working on task Mi,j , ci,j ;
The time of player i working in task j, t;
The energy cost of i working in j until time t, ci,j,t;
Task Mk;
The cost of player i working on task Mi,k, ci,k;
The average unit price of energy used to task Mk, pk;
α and β: weight parameters
Adjust coefficient of reputation, µ;
Adjust coefficient of evaluation value, ψ;
Coefficient value, λ.
Weights, ω = (ω1, ω2)
Output:
Payoff Ψi,j , Ψi,k
1: (Eoi − Eri,j)← 0, Pi,j,t ← 0, Pi,j ← 0, oj ← 0, ok ← 0
2: U ← Pi,j − Pi,j,t,k
3: if Eri > ξ1(Ei,k + E
f
i ) then
4: εi ← ηoi,k + βo′i,k
5: else
6: εi ← oi,k
7: end if
8: r′i ← ri + εi
9: if Ēk < ξ2Ek then
10: E1( ´εi,k)← 0
11: else
12: E2( ´εi,k)← 0
13: fi,k ← λlog2(1 + r
′
i
C )v − λlog2(1 +
ri
C )v
14: c∗i,k ← fi,k
15: Ψi,k ← c∗i,k
16: Φ′(i|ω)← Ψ(i|ω)
17: if Φ′(i|ω) is extrema then
18: extrema is the equilibrium point
19: else




The lines 1 and 2 represent the original input of the
algorithm. From line 3, the εi can be updated according
to the Equation (19)-(23). The E1( ´εi,k) or E2( ´εi,k) can be
achieved by Equations (24) and (25). From line 13 to 22 of
the algorithm, the extrema Φ′(i|ω) is reached by iterating the
value of Φ(i|ω), which is corresponding to the Equations of
(28)-(35) in the above derivations. The meaning details of the
lines can also be referenced in the models and mechanism.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate
the effects of critical parameters to the strategy of UAVs
scheduling, by which the fluctuations of hyper-parameters
(such as energy cost, reputation etc.) can be indicated to the
mechanism. The scenario is as follows: 1 control center was
defined, two UAVs were pointed in working situation and
under the control of the center. Only one task request was
broadcast to UAVs by control center at each time. The number
of tasks of each service was 200, and the original energy of
each UAV had 2000 J.
Our work can be divided into the sections: 1) the system
belief determination, 2) the effects of dominant parameters to
the energy cost and payoff, and 3) the relationships among im-
portant paired hyper-parameters including energy consumption
and reputation, tasks and reputation, tasks achievement and
reputation increment, as well as the parameters that directly
affect the hyper-parameters.
A. Experimental Settings and Belief Determination
We assume that all UAVs are randomly distributed in a
working region, and a control center can interact with them
constantly. A large number of iterations are set for 10000 to
demonstrate the convergence process of belief. The parameters
are selected as follows:
• Number of UAVs: 2
• Tasks Mj = Mk= 200
• The original energy capacity of player i, Eoi,j = 2000;
• The average unit price of energy used to task Mj , pj=
10
• The energy cost for player transfer,Efj,k = 200;
• The unit cost of player i working on task Mi,j , ci,j= 10.
• Adjust coefficient of evaluation value, ψ = 0.5
• Weights, ω = (ω1, ω2)= (0.5, 0.5)
The detailed parameters for comparison are set in subsections.
Therefore, each UAV has 200 tasks to run. We set the initial
payoff to 400, the reputation weight η to 0.8, and coefficient of
reputation compensation λ to 0.2. Based on these settings, we
can adjust the parameters according to the obvious fluctuation
of energy consumption and payoff caused by reputations in the
following experiments. The detailed parameters settings and
analysis on ξ1 and ξ2, and other parameters are presented in the
following subsections. Fig. 5 shows the fluctuations of system
beliefs of both players along with the increasing number of
iterations, where the approximation value of 0.5 means the
equal probability of choosing the two strategies.
As we described in the preliminary work, Bayes rule implies
the perfect equilibrium in belief mechanism, where the proba-
bility distribution of possible payoffs of players can be derived
with incomplete information of other players [36]. Different
system beliefs will produce different payoffs of players, which
can cause the uncertainty of the ultimate payoff. Sarangi
[37] analysed the beliefs in the epistemic logic sense and
argued the evident importance of networks with incomplete
information. Belief updating rule was introduced for sequential
games in [38], and the equilibrium predictions differing from
the original rule were compared to the new one. The Belief
structure of novel matrix game was described in [39], and
heterogeneous cooperative belief for social dilemma in multi-
agent system was clarified in [40]. Therefore, a reliable belief
in a game process is of great importance.
B. Numerical Results
According to the above result, the belief is set up as
µ = 0.5. This setting of belief will show different payoffs
of players under the two strategic options with the fluctuation
of reputation. In our work, an UAV faces two strategic options
(stay and leave), which will bring the variation of energy
consumption and the change of reputation. These two metrics
are treated as the main factors affecting payoffs of players. We
Fig. 5: Belief determination.
(a) The energy consumption obtained by the proposed model under the
parameter η = 0.8
(b) The energy consumption obtained by the proposed model under the
parameter η = 0.5
Fig. 6: The effect of the parameter η on energy consumption
(a) The payoff obtained from the proposed model under the parameter
λ = 0.2
(b) The payoff obtained from the proposed model under the parameter
λ = 0.5
Fig. 7: The effect of the parameter λ on payoff
first set related parameters and then adjust them accordingly.
The reputation compensation ε = 0.2, the weight of the action
preference of players α = 0.5, coefficient of trust value of
players δ = 0.5, the minimum weight of required energy
ξ1 = 0.5, the maximum weight of required energy ξ2 = 1, the
weight of expected payoff ω1 = ω2 = 0.5, and the original
energy of a player Eoi = 2000. The required energy for task
j and k are 600. The average unit price of energy of an UAV
staying in the task j is 10, which is equal to the average price
of unit energy for an UAV leaving for a new task k. In what
follows, the effects of different parameters are investigated.
The effect of parameter η on energy consumption. As shown
in Fig. 6, the parameter η indicates the leading weight of an
increment in reputation of a player in task k. Compared to
the weight of the reputation increment β, it should be more
than half of the weight, so we set η = 0.8. Thus, we have
β = 0.2 because η + β = 1 is associated with the reputation
expectation in Eq. (13). Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) show the effect of
parameter η on energy consumption. We set η = 0.5 and η =
0.8 to compare different energy consumption under different
parameter values. Operators always intend to reduce the energy
consumption so as to maximize their profits. When η = 0.8
or 0.5, the energy consumption of two players are rising. The
reduction of energy consumption shown at inflection point in
Fig. 6(b), is because the UAV stops working for the current
task and transfers to another site for a new task. The larger
value of η than 0.8 lead to more energy consumption but the
smaller of η than 0.5 brings about the unstable reputation.
The latter η shown in Fig. 6(b) presents the energy efficiency
apparently.
The effect of parameter λ on payoff. As shown in Figs. 7(a)
and 7(b), the payoff is designed from the perspective of the
energy consumption of executing task j (or partial executions
of tasks j and k in the case that the UAV moves to perform
the new task k after this UAV leaving the working site of task
j), as well as reputation changes. We notice that the payoff is
increasing according to the figures. The reputation shown in
x-axis means that an UAV has chosen a strategy, the reputation
is going up but the payoff would not change for its maximum.
From the previous model, we know that the payoff is not
only affected by parameter λ, but also by parameter η which
associates with the compensation of reputation. We investigate
the effect of payoff by setting λ = 0.2 and 0.5, respectively.
The distinct difference of the payoff in Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) lies
in the amount of payoff, even though they are in similar trends.
In Fig. 7(b), the payoff of player 1 can achieve approximate
950, after which it stops growing up. This means it is in
the equilibrium point. However, in Fig. 7(a), the setting of λ
contributes to reach the equilibrium point but the payoff is less
than that shown in Fig. 7(b). The difference between players
1 and 2 in Fig. 7(a) is more significant than that in Fig. 7(b).
It is necessary to clarify that in our experiment, equilibrium
point dose not always exist when we adjust the parameters
with extreme values. In this case, the payoff results do not
converge to stable values. From our results, we are noticed that
the energy consumption and the reputation associated payoff
contribute to UAV scheduling strategies.
The effect of parameter µ on reputation fluctuation. This
parameter affects player’s reputation increment, and it inte-
grates η of players reputations into two different working
situations (finish or not). As we know, µ is in range of 0
∼ 1. The fluctuation of reputation is shown in Figs. 6(a) and
6(b), from which a discount exists for the energy consumption
so that the stable fluctuations are from 1.0 to 3.0. With the
extensive experiments, it is observed that when η is 0.8, the
lines indicate that the energy consumption and reputation are
positively correlated. However, when the µ equals to 0.5, the
energy consumption of player 2 goes down and then maintains
its steady in a level.
The effects of ξ1 and ξ2 on tasks. As shown in Fig. 8,
these two parameters stand for the minimum and maximum
coefficients of energy consumption required to finish the task
k. We keep the other parameters fixed and similar with the
discussion above to set the value ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 1. When
an UAV needs to take a strategy option of stay or leave,
the required energy consumption of finishing the tasks is
oscillatory due to task loads. According to Equation (33), when
we predict the energy expectation, the maximum coefficient
with less than 0.5 will increase the payoff with the purpose of
Ψi maximization, but it will stagnate the reputation increment
which is described in Equation (31). The setting of ξ1 = 0.5,
ξ2 = 1 derives the expectation value which satisfies the
purpose of dependability of energy requirement by reducing
errors. We divide our experimental results into 30 groups to
indicate the effects of ξ1 and ξ2 on tasks. The right y-axis
represents the percentage that different value combinations of
ξ1 and ξ2. As shown in Fig. 8, we can see that when ξ1 = 0.5,
ξ2 = 1, the accomplishment degree is the highest.
Fig. 8: The effects of parameters ξ1 and ξ2 on tasks.
Fig. 9: The compensation trend of reputation with time frame.
The compensation trend of reputation. In Fig. 9, we demon-
strate the compensation trend of reputation under the time
frame based on the prior parameters’ setting. According to
the performance of energy consumption in Fig. 6 (a) and Fig.
6(b), and the payoffs achievement in Fig. 7 (a) and Fig. 7(b),
the critical parameters η = 0.5 and λ = 0.5 are appointed to
conduct this experiment for the low energy consumption and
the high payoffs. The trend from the beginning to 250s shows a
sharp decline and then tends to be stable in the following time
slots. The slight fluctuations of the compensation performance
in the following time slots imply the restrictions of energy
to the compensation change which have been theoretically
supported by Equations (16), (18), (24) and Equation (27).
The relationships of hyper parameters.
• Energy Consumption and Reputation: As shown in
Fig. 10, based on the performance of the UAV and the
degree of tasks fulfilment, the score from customers are
assigned according to the historic records. In our experi-
ments, we input the initial score randomly from 0 ∼ 5 and
depict them in X-axis. The energy consumption which
reflects the achievement situation of tasks is described
in Y-axis. Their relationships with given reputations are
displayed in Fig. 10. The lowest point of blue line is
provided with value 2 of reputation score, which means
that the UAV changes its task upon the control center
request. The rising tread of energy consumption of this
player indicates its flying action and the execution of
the new job. We notice that the main reason of player
1 changing its working site is due to the result of the
game process. However, player 2 sticking in the current
working site causes the continuous increase in energy
consumption, which is explicated in the orange line.
Fig. 10: Energy consumption vs. reputation increase
• Tasks and Reputation: As shown in Fig. 11, we con-
sider that each UAV has 200 tasks to run, which is
described in the x-axis. The normalization of reputation
is represented by y-axis. The blue line indicates that the
achievement of tasks is in steady rise. During the process,
the reputation, expressed by red cross, goes up with the
extent of tasks fulfilment. Above the blue line, the red
cross points show the reputation change of the UAV due
to the shift of working tasks.
• Tasks F inish and Reputation Increment: Based on
the above analysis, the tasks waiting to be executed and
the reputation increment can be seen in Fig. 12. The
downward trend of yellow line of waiting tasks means
that the waiting tasks decrease along with the time passes.
The trend of yellow scatters demonstrate the decrease of
waiting tasks and the red scatters stand for the falling of
reputation increment. This figure demonstrates that the
more tasks completed, the less of reputation increment
obtained.
Fig. 11: Tasks finish vs. reputation increase.
Fig. 12: Task Waiting vs. Reputation Increment.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
UAVs scheduling strategy is one of the typical mobile edge
computing in IoT applications. In this paper, we analyzed an
UAVs application scenario and investigated specific challenges
in strategic scheduling. The great requirement in challenging
is that the decrease of energy consumption and increase of
the reputation should be guaranteed simultaneously. In order
to address the problem, we formulate the energy consumption
and reputation model in a multiple tasks scenario with respect
to the commercial profit maximization of network operators.
The payoff-credits model, energy model and reputation model
have been built respectively for the basis of the mechanism.
Through the game framework combined with reputation mech-
anism, the equilibrium point is reached in our experiment.
This mechanism includes energy consumption and the change
of reputation, therefore, we have analyzed the performance
of the UAV by a few groups of hyper-parameters (such as
energy consumption and reputation, tasks finish and reputa-
tion increment etc.). The significant parameters impacting the
performance of energy cost, reputation, payoff and tasks are
also analyzed.
Through the performance analysis of energy consumption
and the reputation, it can be clearly seen that the increment of
the reputation does not always cause the continuous increase
of energy, which is the opposite of the intrinsic view. The trend
and performance of the energy consumption and payoff show
the superiority of the selected UAV. This advantage implies
that the mechanism can be considered for the long-term profit
maximization of operators. In addition, the developed model
can be further utilized in similar optimal payoff issues in the
future.
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